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The history of philosophy presents a variety of viewpoints regarding the ontological primacy 
of either change or constancy. Some views regard change as foundational, to the point where 
constancy is denied (e.g. Heraclitus). Other views regard constancy as so important, that 
change becomes unthinkable (e.g. Parmenides). The apparent dialectical tension between 
the different conceptions demands an ontological clarification of these issues. This study 
illustrates and evaluates the relationship between change and constancy in the viewpoints 
of various philosophers and scientists throughout history. This is done by appropriating a 
reformational insight that change and constancy exist in cohesion. The study finds that the 
relationship between change and constancy is not dialectical, but rather one of integration, 
seated in irreducible primitive domains (modalities). The purpose of the article is twofold (1) 
to show that change and constancy cannot be reduced to one another but can only exist in a 
relationship of coherence and (2) to contribute a systematic clarification of framework change 
in terms of the relationship between change and onstancy on the ontological level.
Orientation
In epistemic frameworks, change and constancy occur according to a pattern. This pattern reflects 
the irreducibility of coherents (modalities), where change and constancy exist in cohesion. As a 
result, change can never be completely random or absolute.
This central theoretical assumption underlies a research project discerning a level of consensus 
regarding the characteristics and functions of epistemic frameworks (Loubser 2013), as well as the 
factors shaping framework change and the relationship between these factors (Loubser in press). 
A further part of this project tries to achieve clarity on how framework changes occur (Loubser 
2012). Framework changes can, for instance, be conceptualised as being either constrained, 
predictable and even predetermined or random, unpredictable and free from constraints. 
Some conceptions attempt a synthesis between the more radical positions. At an earlier phase 
of the research project the need for an ontological exploration of change and constancy and of 
substantiation of the main thesis (Loubser 2012) was announced.
In recent philosophy, some conceptions seem to regard change as foundational, to the point 
where change becomes the only constant.1 The conceptions where change is everything and 
constancy denied can be traced from antiquity (Heraclitus Fr. 12, 49a)2 and are also popular in 
1.I am referring to this group of philosophers as an example, but will not deal with them here. I have already mentioned them in other 
articles (Loubser in press, 2012).
2.The numbering of the fragments is in accordance with the notation in Diels and Kranz (1959–1960). 
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’n Ontologiese verkenning van verandering en konstantheid. Die geskiedenis van filosofie 
vertoon ’n verskeidenheid van standpunte aangaande die ontologiese voorrang van óf 
verandering óf konstantheid. Sommige beskouings aanvaar verandering as fundamenteel, tot die 
punt waar konstantheid ontken word (bv. Heraklitus). Ander beskouings aanvaar konstantheid 
as so belangrik, dat verandering ondenkbaar word (bv. Parmenides). Die oënskynlike dialektiese 
spanning tussen die verskillende konsepsies vereis ’n ontologiese uitklaring van die kwessies. 
Hierdie studie illustreer en evalueer die verhouding tussen verandering en konstantheid in 
die standpunte van verskeie wetenskapsfilosowe deur die geskiedenis. Dit word gedoen deur 
’n reformatoriese insig aan te neem, naamlik dat verandering en konstantheid in ’n kohesie 
bestaan. Die studie vind dat die verhouding tussen verandering en konstantheid nie dialekties is 
nie, maar eerder een van integrasie, gesetel in onreduseerbare primitiewe domeine (modaliteite). 
Die doel van die artikel is tweeledig (1) om te toon dat verandering en konstantheid nie tot 
mekaar gereduseer kan word nie, maar in ’n verhouding van koherensie bestaan en (2) om 
’n sistematiese uitklaring van raamwerkverandering, in terme van die verhouding tussen 
verandering en konstantheid op die ontologiese vlak, by te dra.
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postmodernity. They do, however, harbour some problematic 
internal incoherence. In order for change to be recognised, 
some kind of constancy must be present (Strauss 2005:225) 
and the idea that change itself becomes the only constant 
is therefore rather paradoxical. Other conceptions regard 
constancy as fundamental to the point where change 
becomes unthinkable (Parmenides Fr. 2, 6, 7, 8). The apparent 
dialectical tension between these different conceptions of 
change and constancy has its roots in antiquity and demands 
an ontological clarification of these issues.
This brings us to the problem statement of the current article: 
What is the ontological relationship between change and 
constancy?
The present investigation proceeds by evaluating a few 
different ontological conceptions of the relationship between 
change and constancy in antiquity. Since the issue appears 
to be still problematic in philosophy, a few modern and 
postmodern conceptions are considered in addition to the 
more ancient examples.3 This article does not attempt to 
provide a complete history of the idea, but merely shows 
that some problems do not die off easily and that some basic 
trends seem to repeat themselves. 
I will argue (with Strauss) for a position where change and 
constancy go hand in hand, because they are both rooted in 
primitive domains (modalities) which are irreducible. Change 
is based on the physical aspect of reality and constancy is 
rooted in the kinematic aspect (Strauss 2009:164–167). Should 
we relate this ontological principle to epistemic frameworks, it 
would appear that they do not change absolutely or arbitrarily, 
but rather have some kind of plasticity (Loubser 2012).
In the following sections I explore the relationship between 
change and constancy in Greek philosophy, whilst also 
paying some attention to the theme of unity and diversity in 
order to sketch a broader picture and to show how all these 
issues are interrelated.
Change and constancy in Antiquity
Thales
According to Allen (1966:1) every history of philosophy 
begins with Thales. This article happens to begin with the 
opinions of Thales as well, since his philosophy serves as 
the framework of beliefs which gave rise to ancient thought 
about the nature of change and constancy.
Thales’s pronouncement that the source of all things is water 
means that (1) all things must have a source and (2) that this 
source is singular (i.e. one thing) (Allen 1966:1–2). From these 
two assumptions, it follows that:
 the universe is bound to a single principle, the primordial water, 
by a single relationship, that of derivation’ and that ‘nature is one 
whole, with unchanging ways of its own, to be accounted for in 
terms of a unitary principle of explanation. (Allen 1966:2)
3.The most important philosophers and scientists who debated these issues are included. 
Of course there are other important philosophers of science, but they are discussed 
elsewhere (Loubser in press, 2012). 
For Thales, therefore, the nature of the world is singular, 
holistic and constant. Although the primordial water was 
‘alive’ and therefore ‘capable of spontaneous movement’, 
so that it becomes the ‘source of movement’ in the world 
(Allen 1966:2), Thales does not give an explanation of how 
this singular source could change to give rise to diversity in 
the world. The question about change was first posed by 
Anaximander: ‘How is the qualitative diversity of the world 
to be reconciled with the primordial unity of its source?’ 
Anaximander
In order to address this question, Anaximander raises an 
important objection to Thales. For Thales, the primordial 
element is simultaneously unbounded and water. Water (the 
wet) stands in a relationship of opposition to other entities 
that embody the dry. If water were to be unbounded, its 
opposite would cease to exist (Allen 1966:2).4
 
Anaximander proposes that the primordial principle (the 
Unbounded) is not to be associated with any sensible opposite, 
nor does it have any characteristics that can be found in the 
world of sensory experience. The Unbounded is internally 
undifferentiated (Allen 1966:2–3). 
Furthermore, Aristotle5 interprets Anaximander’s Boundless 
to be a mixture of all the sensible opposites (water, air, fire 
and earth) so that ‘the opposites fuse in it’ and ‘it is itself of 
no determinate sort, a thing which is no kind because it is all 
kinds’ (Allen 1966:3). According to Anaximander, the Non-
limited is ‘everlasting and ageless’ (Fr. 2) as well as ‘immortal 
and indestructible’ (Fr. 3; cf. Freeman 1971:19) and therefore 
it is constant. 
Anaximander’s answer to the question about change is that the 
different elements (or opposites) separate from the original 
material and that these opposing elements then ‘war’ upon 
one another (Fr. 1). This enmity between the opposites causes 
a pendulum dynamic (where one opposite, encroaching on 
the domain of the other, is turned into the other, and vice 
versa). This cycle is kept in balance by Time, so that the world 
is in equilibrium (Fr. 1; cf. Allen 1966:3). In this way, although 
constancy still prevails in his philosophy, Anaximander tries 
to account for change.
Anaximander is not the only philosopher to propose an 
answer to the question about change, and a different 
conception can be found in the thought of Anaximenes.
Anaximenes
For Anaximenes, the primordial unity is to be identified with 
a substance (air, mist or breath) and everything else is made 
out of this material (Fr. 2). Diversity in the world occurs when 
this primary substance undergoes change of a quantitative 
nature. This means that qualitative diversity is dependent 
on the quantitative variation (thickening and thinning, 
4.Anaximander’s objection to Thales is reported by Aristotle Physics 204b 24.
5.See Aristotle Physics 187a 12; cf. Allen (1966:31).
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condensation and rarefaction) of the primary substance 
(Allen 1966:4). According to Anaximenes, air (when made 
finer) becomes fire or (when made thicker) wind. When air 
is made thicker still, it progressively becomes cloud, water, 
then earth, stones and everything else (Freeman 1971:33). 
Anaximenes believes, like Thales, that the primary substance 
is ensouled and this is the cause of motion in the world (Allen 
1966:4). Interestingly, for Anaximenes, motion is eternal, but 
change comes about through it. The primary substance (air) 
is revealed by motion and is always in motion, for ‘things that 
change do not change unless there be movement’ (Freeman 
1971:33–34). I will come back to change and constancy in 
relation to energy and movement later (see below), since 
it appears that in Modernity movement is associated with 
constancy rather than change. 
Heraclitus
Like Anaximander, Heraclitus espouses a principle of 
isonomy that maintains balance in the world process. In 
the case of Heraclitus, this principle is called ‘logos’ and 
is identified with a sensible element, namely fire (Fr. 30; 
cf. Allen 1966:10). As the first principle of knowledge, the 
‘logos’ has connotations of proportion, measure and pattern. 
For Heraclitus, however, the ‘logos’ also represents the 
first principle of existence: it is the ‘unity of the world that 
sustains it as a process’ (Fr. 1; cf. Allen 1966:10). The ‘logos’ 
maintains the balance between diverse and conflicting 
opposites in ‘strife’. This balance differs from the equilibrium 
brought about by Time in Anaximander. According to Allen 
(1966:10), Anaximander’s Time produces equilibrium in a 
cyclical alteration of excess, whereas the ‘logos’ in Heraclitus 
maintains the balance at every given moment. Since the 
balance is continuous, the opposites being drawn apart are 
drawn back together at the same time and thus they are being 
maintained, constantly, in equal measures (Allen 1966:10).6 
This means that the world process, for Heraclitus, is a circle 
and that movement in any direction around the circle is 
continually balanced by movement in the opposite direction 
(i.e. the way up and the way down happen simultaneously: 
Fr. 60). The opposites, then, become in a sense the same (Fr. 
88; cf. Allen 1966:10–11). 
Vollenhoven (2005a:35) emphasises the point further: the 
two processes do not follow one another, but rather happen 
simultaneously, so that the continuation in the world is 
a matter of ‘the continual running into each other of two 
simultaneous streams’.7 In the first place, this type of thinking 
is contradictory. Because the world is self-contradictory, ‘the 
knowledge that describes this world cannot acknowledge as 
norm principles that would exclude contradictions in thinking’ 
(Vollenhoven 2005a:35). Secondly, because the origin of all 
things is eternally active fire, Heraclitus is a monist. This leads 
Vollenhoven (2005a:35; cf. 2005b:92) to describe Heraclitus’s 
thought as a form of contradictory monism.
6.Heraclitus uses the metaphor of the bow (or lyre) to describe this back-stretched 
connection (Fr. 51; cf. Allen 1966:10).
7.For Vollenhoven (2005a:35), the term ‘coincidentia oppositorum’ [coincidence of 
opposites] is eminently suited to this concept.
Although the ‘logos’ itself is constant (Allen 1966:11), the 
emphasis in Heraclitus’s world is very much on change (Fr. 
91). Both Plato and Aristotle describe this as the doctrine of 
perpetual flux where ‘all things change and nothing remain 
at rest’.8 The first reaction against this doctrine is provided 
by Parmenides.
Parmenides
In Parmenides’s view, the belief in the reality of the physical 
world (of plurality and change) is unsatisfactory and is 
to be substituted by the belief in One Being. The latter is 
unchanging, ungenerated, indestructible and spherical (Fr. 
7, 8; cf. Allen 1966:12). His justification for belief in the One 
Being is demonstrated in the poem, Way of Truth, by reference 
to a disjunction, which can be reduced to ‘It is or It is not’. The 
first disjunct is the ‘way of true inquiry’, whereas the second 
is the ‘unthinkable, unknowable, not to be uttered’; and since 
thinking and being share the same ontological status (for 
Parmenides), the second disjunct is to be wholly rejected (Fr. 
2; cf. Allen 1966:11). 
In contrast to the ‘way of true inquiry’, Parmenides (Fr. 6) also 
refers to the ‘way of mortal opinion’. The latter presupposes 
the world of nature as having contents which ‘come to be 
and cease to be’ and thus can be reduced to: ‘It is and is 
not’. For Parmenides, the ‘way of mortal opinion’ is also to 
be rejected, again on the grounds of the original disjunction 
(Fr. 8; cf. Allen 1966:12). This means that Parmenides draws 
a distinction between appearance and reality as well as 
between knowledge and opinion. In the end, plurality and 
change are rejected in favour of constancy. 
It would appear as though, at the beginning of the fifth 
century, Greek opinions regarding the relationship between 
change and constancy are rather polarised. On the one 
hand, Heraclitus emphasises change, whereas, on the 
other, Parmenides argues that constancy has ontological 
primacy. It is not surprising, then, that the reaction to this 
situation included attempts to synthesise the two opposing 
positions. According to Allen (1966:14–15), the main 
challenge after Parmenides was to reconcile the sensible 
world (of plurality and change) with criteria for reality 
that it cannot satisfy. These criteria include that the world 
should be intelligible and therefore free from generation and 
destruction (i.e. change). 
Empedocles: An attempt at integration?
The proposal from Empedocles rests on the notion that 
certain elements are constant (satisfying the criteria of reality) 
and that change occurs when these elements are rearranged 
(Allen 1966:14–15). Like Parmenides, Empedocles denies 
the possibility of generation and destruction and accepts 
the existence of a holistic ‘Sphere of Being’. Contrary to 
Parmenides, however, Empedocles conceives the Sphere as 
full of sensible opposites (the hot, the cold, the wet and the 
dry). Change occurs when these constant qualities rearrange 
8.See Heraclitus Fr. 12; Plato Cratylus 402a and Aristotle Physics 253b 9.
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within the Sphere (Fr. 17; cf. Allen 1966:15). The arrangement 
of the qualities occurs continually under the compulsion 
of the cosmic forces of Love and Strife. This means that 
the various compounds (complex substances of the world) 
come to be and pass away, but simultaneously the primary 
qualities constituting the substances remain the same (Fr. 17; 
cf. Allen 1966:15). Vollenhoven, however, does not regard 
Empedocles’s philosophy of change and constancy as an 
attempt at integration. He (2005a:35, 2005b:127–128) classifies 
Empedocles as a dualist and a structuralist,9 inclined to 
constancy (cf. Olthuis & De Graaff 1978:20–21).
Evaluation
The natural philosophers can broadly be divided into two 
groups. The first group proceeds from an original unity 
(monism). Duality and plurality are still recognised, but must 
be explained in terms of the original unity and are therefore 
seen as secondary (Vollenhoven 2005a:33). In this group, we 
may place, for instance, Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes 
and Heraclitus. The second group begins with more than one 
origin (dualism). Here, two or more equally original (and 
correlative) causes need to come together in order to give 
a secondary explanation for unity (Vollenhoven 2005a:33). 
Parmenides and Empedocles may be placed in this group.
Vollenhoven neatly distinguishes the issue of unity and 
multiplicity (monism and dualism) from the issue of change 
and constancy. In fact, both monists and dualists can be 
inclined to cosmogonic or structuralist thought. One should 
grant that monists are more often inclined to cosmogonic 
philosophy, whilst dualists and pluralists are inclined to 
structuralism. The reason for this seems to be a search for 
‘balance’ (Olthuis & De Graaff 1978:21–22). Yet there are 
monists who are structuralists and dualists who choose 
cosmogonic thinking.
With regard to the main problem statement of the article, 
ancient thought seems to be polarised into positions giving 
ontological primacy either: (1) to constancy or (2) to change. 
Between these two poles there also seems to exist a third 
position (3) attempting an integration of positions (1) and 
(2). According to the classification of Vollenhoven (2005a:35), 
this does not amount to a true integration, and in his method 
he keeps using only two categories: structuralist and 
cosmogonic philosophies.
The members of group (1) include Thales, Anaximander, 
Anaximenes and Parmenides. For Thales, nature is constant 
and no explanation of how this singular substance could 
change is given. Anaximander regards the primary principle 
as everlasting and indestructible (and therefore as constant) 
and defines change as the ‘separation’ of different opposites 
from this original material. The primary substance for 
Anaximenes remains constant, so that change is only 
understood in terms of qualitative variation (thickening 
9.Philosophers in a ‘structuralist’ mode of thinking tend to emphasise constancy, 
whereas philosophers in a ‘geneticist’ mode emphasise change, development and 
becoming (Olthuis & De Graaff 1978:20–21).
and thinning, condensation and rarefaction) of the primary 
substance. However, in Parmenides, group (1) acquires its 
most radical proponent. He rejects change for belief in the 
One Being, which is absolutely unchanging.
With regard to position of group (2), the thought of Heraclitus 
places the emphasis very much on change. For Heraclitus, the 
first principle (‘logos’) maintains a balance between diverse 
and conflicting opposites. This means that the world process 
is in continuous flux.
In the next section, we find the continuation of some of these 
issues in modernity and postmodernity. 
Change and constancy in modernity 
and postmodernity
An introductory overview
In the previous section, we have seen various ancient 
conceptions giving ontological primacy to either change or 
constancy. Debates on these dilemmas seem to be perennial 
in the history of philosophy and, of course, continued 
through the Middle Ages. This article, however, forms part of 
a research project (Loubser 2012, 2013, in press) investigating 
more contemporary trends and does therefore not provide 
a complete historical overview. 
Focusing on more recent examples, we again find conceptions 
emphasising change, to the point that it becomes the only 
constant (e.g. in Darwin, as well as some popular postmodern 
conceptions). Other conceptions may regard constancy as 
being fundamental to the point that change is denied. This can 
lead to positions that grant ontological primacy to constancy 
to the extent that change becomes unthinkable, for example 
in the viewpoints of Von Varga (1953:59–61). The apparent 
dialectical tension between the different conceptions of 
change and constancy has also given rise to contemporary 
attempts at finding ‘patterns’ in changes. One such example 
can be found in the work of Gerald Holton.
Holton (1978:8) finds elements (themata) that function to 
constrain, motivate, guide and even polarise scientific research 
and scientists. This means that there are constant themes 
in scientific concepts, methods, problems and hypotheses. 
Even though the themata function at an epistemological, 
rather than the ontological level, we can infer that they tell 
us something about the world through their importance in 
science. Moreover, Holton (1978:10) finds that the number of 
themata is limited (in fact, very small) with new themata being 
added only very rarely. This means that the themata are very 
persistent and that they fare very well in newly elaborated 
contexts. 
In this project we have often dealt with work of philosophers 
of science. However, the work of some scientists themselves 
also seems to contain a polarised notion of either change, or 
constancy. In the next two sections, we look at examples in 
the legacies of Charles Darwin and Albert Einstein.
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The importance of change in the work of Darwin
In his work On the origin of species, Charles Darwin (1869:92) 
defined ‘natural selection’ as the ‘preservation of favorable 
variations, and the destruction of injurious variations’. 
According to Darwin (1869), variations that are inert would 
not be affected by natural selection but would be: 
left as a fluctuating element, as perhaps we see in certain 
polymorphic species, or would ultimately become fixed, owing 
to the nature of the organism and the nature of the conditions. 
(p. 92)
Vollenhoven (2005b:96–97) regards Darwin as a monist and 
a geneticist. With regard to change and constancy, Darwin 
seems to hold that the natural (biological) world is inherently 
changeful10 and that only the ‘fittest’ survive. This has led 
neo-Darwinism to regard the action of two phenomena, that 
of mutation and natural selection to occur in tandem (Strauss 
2009:110). Since mutation normally occurs to the organism’s 
detriment, only when the aforementioned phenomena act 
in tandem can the disadvantaged living entity emerge as the 
advantaged. 
According to Strauss (2009:110–111), the role attributed 
to mutation and natural selection support the main thesis 
of neo-Darwinism, namely the assumption that the only 
reality within ‘living’ nature is change. Strauss (2009:110–
111) criticises this assumption by stating that ‘only when 
mutation and natural selection are operating as a constant 
(conditioning) law for the existence of living entities, is it 
possible to account for the changefulness of the latter’. His 
point is that the law-effect of mutation and natural selection 
is supposed to be constant and therefore not everything is 
changing in the bio-world. 
It is not only in the world of biology where scientists think 
about change and constancy. In the next section we consider 
an example from the world of physics.
The importance of constancy in some physical 
theories
According to Strauss (2009:411), a proper elaboration of the 
insight that change presupposes constancy, can be found in 
Galileo’s formulation of the law of inertia and in Einstein’s 
theory of relativity. The core of Einstein’s theory primarily 
emphasises constancy (of the velocity of light in a vacuum). 
This means that whatever is in motion moves relatively to 
an element of constancy (Strauss 2009:411). Furthermore, 
for Einstein, the distinction between the kinematic and 
physical aspects of reality is related to the difference between 
reversibility and irreversibility (Einstein 1959:43; cf. Strauss 
2011:6–7). This enables Einstein to reject the viewpoint that 
all physical processes are reversible and thus reducible to 
mechanistic movement (Strauss 2011:7). Galileo’s insights 
and formulation of the law of inertia is revisited below. 
Before then, it is time to consider the nature of change and 
10.Strauss (2009:111, fn. 1) points out that this assumpti on greatly in� uences Darwin’s 
use of language. The terms ‘constancy’ (2) or ‘persistence/persistently’ (3) occur 
in a total of five instances in his work (Darwin 1869), whereas terms like ‘change’ 
(268), ‘variation’ (281) and ‘variations’ (162) occur much more frequently (number 
of occurrences indicated in brackets).
constancy as understood in the reformational tradition, in 
order to provide an alternative view that offers a valuable 
contribution towards solving the issue.
 
Attempts at integration: 
A reformational perspective
In the reformational tradition, two dimensions delimit what 
we can experience and therefore constitute the horizon of 
experience, namely modal aspects (so-called functions, aspects 
or modalities) and concrete (natural and social) entities 
(Strauss 2009:67). The dimensions cohere so that the modal 
aspects are ‘universal, constant, functional frameworks at 
the basis of all entitary functioning and thus co-conditions 
the occurrence of all kinds of events’ (Strauss 2009:67, 68–71). 
Apart from the relationship between the two dimensions, 
the modal aspects themselves also cohere with one another. 
In order to understand this inter-modal coherence, we must 
first explore the structure of the modal aspects. If change and 
constancy are respectively seated in two of the modal aspects, 
this line of argumentation can lead to demonstrating that 
change and constancy also cohere. This is done by proposing 
a synopsis of the views of Dooyeweerd, Strauss and Hart in 
which the eventual differences between them are neglected, 
in an attempt to show my own position.
The characteristics of modal aspects
In Dooyeweerd’s (1979:40–41) ontology, created reality 
displays several modes (i.e. aspects or modalities) in the 
temporal order. Although the modes are irreducible to 
each other, they have analogical coherence. Dooyeweerd 
distinguishes between the numerical, spatial, kinematic, 
physical, biotic, psychical, logical, historical, lingual, social, 
economical, aesthetic, judicial, ethical and certitudinal modes 
of being. These modes of being can be understood as having 
the following characteristics:
1. Aspects have ontic status as universal functional modes 
of existence (belonging to a distinct dimension) and this 
means that aspects are neither functions nor properties 
of things (Hart 1984:198–201; Strauss 2006:64–69). 
According to Hart (1984:85–134), modal aspects cohere 
with the dimension of entities without being ‘dependent’ 
upon those entities for their irreducible ‘dimensional’ 
existence. This means that the dimension of modal aspects 
co-determines the existence of entities (and events) in 
the sense that the latter invariably function within them. 
Furthermore, whenever entities or events function within 
a particular modal aspect, the unqualified universal 
meaning of the aspect requires a specification that is 
‘coloured’ by the entity-structure of the entity function 
within the mode (Strauss 2009:143).
2. The difference between aspects and entities implies that 
there are two distinct kinds of laws: (1) ‘laws for aspects’ 
(universal modal laws) and (2) ‘laws for entities’ (type 
laws) (Strauss 2009:25). In general, it can be said that 
modal laws hold for all possible classes of entity, whereas 
type laws hold for a limited class of entity only (Strauss 
2009:79).
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3. According to Dooyeweerd (1955:1:42–43), objective 
qualities that are ascribed to things in the logical and 
post-logical aspects are related to the subjective functions 
of human nature. They are related in such a way that the 
typical structure of the individuality of the thing (which 
is characterised by a specific relationship to its qualifying 
function) finds expression. Dooyeweerd (1955:1:43) uses 
the example of a bird’s nest (characterised by a specific 
relation to animal life), which remains a bird’s nest with 
respect to its objective logical characteristics and even if it is 
a possible object of human culture, symbolic signification, 
or aesthetic appreciation (Hart 1984:221–242).
4. As a result of (3), we can distinguish between the norm 
side and the factual side within each aspect of reality 
(Strauss 2009:76).
5. The factual side of aspects comprises the subject–subject 
and subject–object relationships, although the first aspect 
is an exception to this, since it has only subject–subject 
relationships (Strauss 2009:76–77).
6. Every modal aspect is fitted into a cosmic time order (Hart 
1984:149ff.), whilst bringing to expression (in its own 
modal structure) a functionally ‘coloured’ manifestation 
of ‘cosmic time’. On the law side, it expresses itself as 
time order and on the factual side as time duration (Strauss 
2009:77). The duration remains constantly subjected to the 
time order, so that, for example, in the aspect of organic 
life, one finds the temporal order of birth, maturing, 
adulthood, ageing and dying in most higher organisms 
(Dooyeweerd 1955:1:28). 
7. Each modal aspect has a core meaning (designated as its 
meaning nucleus or meaning kernel), which makes the 
modal aspect irreducible, indefinable and irreplaceable, 
since it founds the sphere sovereignty of every aspect 
(Strauss 2009:74–75). For Dooyeweerd (1979:43) this 
principle of sphere sovereignty is a creational principle 
connected with the scriptural ground motive of the 
Christian religion.
The above characteristics help us to understand the diversity 
between the aspects. According to Dooyeweerd (1955:2:74) 
full justice ought to be done to the specific sphere-sovereignty 
of the modal law-spheres, because each of the law-spheres 
is a temporal, modal refraction of the religious fullness of 
meaning. This means that every aspect accesses the whole of 
temporal coherence of meaning in its own modal structure. 
However, although the aspects are diverse, they also cohere 
with one another (Hart 1984:164). In the next section, we will 
see how this is possible.
The interrelatedness of modal aspects
The coherence between the modal aspects can be explained 
as follows:
1. Aspects are analogically related through moments of 
coherence with other aspects reflected within the structure 
of the particular aspect (Strauss 2009:75; Hart 1984:162–
163). This means that the meaning of an aspect comes into 
expression only in this coherence. This feature is called 
the sphere universality of each aspect (Strauss 2009:76).
2. There is an order of succession amongst the modal 
aspects (Hart 1984:190–198). This means that ‘the 
modal aspects are fitted into a cosmic order such that 
some are foundational to others’ (Strauss 2009:170). For 
example,11 both the numerical and the spatial aspects are 
presupposed within the structure of the kinematic aspect 
(2009:163). Hart (1984:151) designates the direction going 
through the modal order from lower to higher modes 
as the founding direction of the order. Here the lower 
level functions in a foundational way as support for the 
existence of the higher levels. In contrast, the developmental 
direction refers to the order in which lower functioning 
is enriched as a result of its being made serviceable to a 
higher order (Hart 1984:152).
3. The moments of coherence between the modal aspects 
are referred to as analogies,12 which embrace both 
retrocipations (backwards pointing towards coherence 
between an aspect and earlier aspects in the cosmic order 
of time) and anticipations (forward-pointing coherence 
towards aspects later in the order) (Strauss 2009:75).
4. Furthermore, regarding the relationship between the 
sphere sovereignty (diversity) and sphere universality 
(coherence) of the aspects, Dooyeweerd maintains the 
following:
5. Sphere sovereignty can be maintained within the 
temporal inter-modal coherence of the different aspects 
only if the modal meaning of each law-sphere has a 
structure: law-spheres must have a nucleus guaranteeing 
the sphere sovereignty of the entire aspect. This nucleus 
must be surrounded by a number of analogical modal 
moments which partly refer backwards to the nuclei of 
other aspects and partly refer forward to aspects that are 
later in the cosmic arrangement (Dooyeweerd 1955:2:75; 
cf. Hart 1984:162).
In order to understand the significance of the theory of 
modal aspects for the ontological relationship between 
change and constancy, we first have to determine where the 
latter (respectively) are seated in the modal aspects. This is 
investigated in the next section.
Change and constancy as modal kernels of 
meaning
In defining the meaning nucleus of the kinematic aspect, 
Strauss (2009:89) once more refers to Galileo’s experimental 
derivation of the law of inertia. The experiment rests on the 
hypothesis that whatever moves will continue its movement 
endlessly. This means that, whereas uniform motion does 
not need a cause, a change of motion requires an energy-
input (physical cause) for both acceleration and deceleration. 
According to Strauss (2009:89), movement is something 
original in a functional sense and our immediate experiential 
awareness of uniform motion captures the meaning of 
11.According to Strauss (2009:163), Galileo used a thought experiment in 1638 in 
which he contemplated the movement of a body on a path extended into infinity. 
I agree with Strauss that here the terms ‘path’ and ‘extended’ designate the 
spatial foundation of the kinematic aspect, whereas the term ‘infinity’ captures its 
numerical foundation.
12.Concrete examples of this can be found in composite expressions such as emoti onal 
strength (sensitive and physical aspects), economic trust (economic and certitudinal 
aspects) and aesthetic expression (aesthetic and lingual modes).
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movement as constancy. Therefore, we may adopt the 
synonym constancy when designating the meaning nucleus 
of the kinematic aspect. 
When it comes to the term change, however, we need to 
look to the physical aspect of reality. According to Strauss 
(2009:89) energy in all its forms always causes physical 
changes. This means that energy-operation (the nucleus of 
the physical aspect) entails the cause–effect relationship 
and forms the basis of causality in its original sense. Cause 
and effect always implies change. Terms like ‘change’ or 
‘dynamics’, inasmuch as they are synonyms, may then be used 
to designate the nuclear meaning of the physical mode.
Change and constancy are interrelated
In the previous section we saw that constancy is seated in 
the kinematic aspect, whereas change belongs to the physical 
aspect of reality. Since the kinematic and physical aspects 
are interrelated, it follows that constancy and change cohere 
as well.
The reason for this coherence is that change can be established 
only on the basis of something persistent and constant 
(Strauss 2009:13). Without an awareness of persistence, the 
very notion of change becomes problematic in the sense of 
the question (Strauss 2009:165): What is it that undergoes 
change? Here, it may be helpful to refer back to point (1) 
above: the meaning of an aspect (or its nucleus, for example, 
change) only comes into expression in the coherence with 
other aspects (or their nuclei, in this case constancy) reflected 
within the structure of a particular aspect (the physical, in 
our current case).
To make the case more concrete, we may borrow yet another 
example from Strauss (2009):
Suppose an ageing person claims that she has changed a lot 
during the past two decades. This statement only has meaning 
on the basis of an implicit awareness of persistence, for there is a 
constant reference to the same person. The relationship between 
change and constancy is therefore an example of the ‘coherence 
of irreducibles. (p. 13)
Acknowledging the coherence of irreducibles between 
the kinematic and the physical aspects, opens up a new 
perspective in which constancy and change are no longer 
considered ‘opposites’ (Strauss 2009:166). An example from 
the natural sciences demonstrates the perspective. Let us 
consider the following statements:
1. The law of inertia assumes the constancy of motion if 
no physical forces interact with the movement under 
consideration. 
2. The discovery of irreversible physical processes (e.g. 
radioactive decay) confirms the distinct and irreducible 
meaning of the physical aspect.
3. There exists an inter-modal connection between the 
kinematic and the physical aspects.
4. Should the above statements be true, there seems to exist 
an analogical moment within the physical aspect, which 
reminds us of the functional meaning of the kinematic 
aspect. This makes it possible to arrive at a more precise 
description of the law of energy conservation: we find 
an analogy of the kinematic aspect on the law side of the 
physical aspect (Strauss 2009:319). 
Conclusion
An investigation of and a comparison between different 
philosophical traditions giving ontological primacy to 
change or constancy, shows that these conceptions cannot 
be regarded as satisfactory. Rather, change and constancy 
are coherent, irreducible dimensions of reality and therefore 
basic (primitive) ontological categories. Change refers to the 
physical aspect of reality, whereas constancy refers to the 
kinematic aspect. These two aspects cannot be reduced to 
each other, but can exist only in a relationship of coherence. 
This means that in epistemic frameworks, change and 
constancy go hand in hand, pointing towards the idea of 
plasticity. This can shed light on the discussions in previous 
articles, in particular in Loubser (2012), where a clarification 
of this topic was announced, to illustrate better what was 
argued in that context.
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